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Summary: Since the onset of the current crisis, numerous intergovernmental
organizations made declarations and plans, but only national packages were
implemented to minimize adverse effects to real (national) economies. Despite
the fact that capital markets have long ago become increasingly complex with a 
multitude of actors, a state-level approach remains firmly in place. This paper
aims to present political responses to the crisis, identifying how politicians
envision the future of capital markets and the world economy. The financial 
crisis might have been a direct motive to start a global political interplay regard-
ing regulation, but it was also a unique opportunity for numerous actors to start
pressing for their own agenda vis-à-vis the global economic and political order. 
Reviewing the responses of several of the most prominent actors on the scene
may contribute to understanding how close the world is to having a new finan-
cial - or even economic - structure on the global level.
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In the years preceding the crisis beginning in 2007/08, economists worldwide happily 
recorded steady growth of total world output and remarkable rises in world trade 
volume, total reserves and cross-border transactions. Nevertheless, beneath those 
optimistic figures, global financial markets burgeoned at a pace that in 2008 started 
to collapse. 
In 2007, the value of global financial assets reached nearly $200 trillion - al-
most double their value in 2003. Total debt recorded a steady rise, particularly from 
2005 to 2007, but governments on average were less keen to borrow than previously 
(Diana Farrell 2005, 2008). Then came the crisis and in 2008, total financial assets 
dropped by more than 11%. The greatest loss was in the US (nearly $5.5 trillion in 
2008), while the Eurozone performed slightly “better” with a loss of $1.6 trillion (In-
ternational Monetary Fund 2009a). 
One of the most striking consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 was a 
steep drop in cross-border capital flows, notably foreign direct investments (FDI), 
from $10.5 trillion in 2007 to just $1.9 trillion in 2008. In comparison to GDP, the 
level of cross-border capital flows in 2008 was the lowest since 1991 (2007, 2009b). 
This created turmoil in the global banking system and severe liquidity crises because 
most types of flows reversed as investors, companies and banks sold foreign assets 
and repatriated the capital into their home countries.  
Although volatility and risk have always been the critical features of any fi-
nancial market, today’s financial markets have added a new dimension derived from 
global linkages and the speed at which volatility is transmitted. In addition, the ups  
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and downs of the global market fragments seem to occur with varying intensity and 
at various points of time in the financial continuum. 
 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (2009). 
 
 
Figure 1  Domestic Market Equity Capitalisation 2000-2009, US$ bn   
 
“There is a great deal about volatility and risk that we do not understand. Even 
more critically, there is quite a bit about volatility and risk that we think we under-
stand but don’t. This kind of ignorance (what we think we know but don’t) can really 
come back and bite us.” (Robert Swartz 2008, p. 2.) What might be true for our un-
derstanding of financial risks and volatility could also hold for a general apprehen-
sion of the global capital market, its inner logic, actors, movements and certainly its 
regulation.  
This paper aims at exploring the debate on global economic governance, par-
ticularly from the aspect of official viewpoints of governments and intergovernmen-
tal organizations expressed with regard to the crisis and its resolution. The methodol-
ogy used in this paper is based on comparative and discourse analyses of official 
pronouncements made by leaders of the most prominent and influential actors on the 
global stage. The discourse analysis aims not only to deliver the informational con-
tent but also to shed more light on the actors’ rhetoric, strategy and argumentation in 
order to explore differences in ranking of basic values. At present, it is still not pos-
sible to analyze (not even to foresee) to what extent the leaders will hold their views 
and implement the corresponding policies. 
 
1. Intergovernmental Politics of the Crisis 
 
The severity and reach of the present crisis have not only seriously affected most 
national economies but has also proved to be an opportunity to question, test or 
change basic principles of dominant neo-liberalism and even capitalism itself. In ad-
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capital flows have been thoroughly researched (for example, Markus K. Brunner-
meier 2008; and Gary B. Gorton 2009), recent literature in this area underscore wider 
political and economic aspects to take into account. Historical examples show how 
severe economic crisis changes
 economic regimes and inter-state relations, as well as 
redistribute
 wealth and power (Robert H. Wade 2009). This aspect of analysis might 
be especially applicable today. Other authors justifiably emphasize that the global 
crisis revises frameworks of the political settlements in terms of using 
(neo)liberalism as a power technology to help transform capitalism (Jose G. Palma 
2009). Still others focus more on the impact side, concluding that systemic banking 
crises, typically preceded by asset price bubbles and large capital inflows, affect rich 
and poor countries alike (Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff 2008). Of par-
ticular importance for this research is work done by authors who point out changes 
occurring with regard to major actors, i.e. the differences in governmental actors’ 
values and foreign policy goals that underlie global movements of capital (Brad Set-
ser 2008; Shai Bernstein 2009), eroding capabilities and legitimacy of contemporary 
governmental actors and politics in general to deal with global challenges (Adam K. 
Webb 2006; Furio Cerutti 2007) or a tendency of major regulators to fall into an un-
der-regulation complacency during favourable economic times (Joshua Aizenman 
2009). Still others (Randall Germain 2007) underscore the lack of an adequate delib-
erative context for decisions involving transnational economic governance for a 
global financial public sphere that emerges. The evidence regarding intensified con-
tacts, communication and action-planning in the intergovernmental world might well 
support Germain’s argument. 
Since September 2008, governments in developed market economies have im-
plemented actions aimed at supporting individual institutions (the so-called “too-big-
to-fail” institutions) and programmes directed to the system as a whole. National 
measures have included, inter alia, capital injections to banks’ capital, taking over 
contaminated assets or extending guarantees to help reduce banks’ exposures to large 
losses, strengthening deposit insurance schemes, cutting reference rates and national-
izing banks. In December 2008, the EU leaders approved an overall package of €400 
billion, with the UK leading the way in national packages assigning 19.8 per cent of 
its GDP for financial sector support. The new US administration succeeded in pass-
ing a bill of $787 billion, the largest in the American history.  
International financial institutions have also stepped in to provide additional 
lending at more favourable conditions, especially for developing countries (Fabio 
Panetta et al. 2009). At the same time, a plethora of diverse political ideas, plans, 
statements and declarations have been made on the causes, effects and prospects of 
the current crisis. 
Regardless of their differences, the intensity of national and international po-
litical debates, particularly around the issues of interdependence and global linkages, 
might point out that a new global/transnational social space is emerging and all so-
cial, political and economic activities are becoming affected by its logic. Such a su-
praterritorial social space seems not bound by territory or distance, and structural 
change occurs independently of agency, frequently used by political leaders to justify 
their decisions as inevitable (Jan A. Scholte 2002, p. 7). A brief quantitative picture  
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of global capital flows given in the introduction shows how all economic activities 
have been affected by the transnational logic. The rest of the paper aims at illustrat-
ing that such structural changes will require agency changes as well. 
Furthermore, structural changes today allow for potential different, multiple 
equilibria because actors’ strategic and tactical choices interact with such changes, 
thus creating a number of potential outcomes. At present, particularly true for global 
capital, numerous interlinked processes design the global scene: internationalization, 
transnationalisation, translocalisation, and so on. In addition, a multitude of actors 
emerge on the supranational scene which had previously been strictly reserved for 
governmental actors, what Cerny calls multinodal politics (Philip Cerny 2007, p. 2) 
and Underhill describes as a relative disarmament of public authorities (Geoffrey 
Underhill and Xiaoke Zhang 2006, p. 29). Even though non-governmental actors 
have gained importance, the extent and consequences of the current crisis proved to 
be an excellent opportunity for authorities to invest in regaining the strength of their 
“arms”.  
Is this crisis simply a final nudge to “destroy” the neoliberal economic order 
that dominates today or are we witnessing a time wherein the level of world “fluid-
ness” requires its total remake (John G. Ruggie 1993, p. 2)? What certainly is beyond 
doubt is the fact that global capital today presents one of the major areas of concern 
for the world economy as a whole and there is a pressing demand for new/updated 
arrangements to be made (Georg Sorensen 2006, pp. 7-9). 
The processes of global political deliberations were directed to two culminat-
ing points: the G20 meetings in London and Pittsburgh. What was planned as a 
showroom for united and orchestrated action actually resulted in a serious compro-
mise between the different agendas of the Anglo-American partnership and the con-
tinental European “league”, while only a few of the developing countries’ proposals 
were adopted. Once again, their overlapping but different agendas have pointed out 
that contemporary politics is one of detachment (Friedrich Kratochwil 2007, p. 5), of 
“cool loyalties” and “thin” patterns of solidarity.  
The London G20 communiqué came out as a result of an ongoing political 
process, lasting for many months and encompassing a variety of issues, standing 
points, interlinked and conflicting values, as well as diverse proposals how to deal 
with the crisis. 
 
2. European Union: Efficiency, Transparency, State Control 
 
In October 2008, the EC Commission issued a communication outlining the Euro-
pean recovery plan (European Union 2008). The plan clearly emphasized the view 
that the current crisis poses an excellent opportunity to achieve a two-fold goal: on 
the one hand, improving endangered EU competitiveness (especially in relation to 
the US and the Far East), and on the other hand, fortifying the Union and rising state 
control. The latter has indeed become one of the stumbling stones in reaching com-
promise over proposals for a new global financial architecture. In addition, the EU 
underscored other goals, such as open markets, sustainable growth, transparency and 
accountability. Also important, decisive, coordinated and effective action backed up 
the communication: at the EU level by the French Presidency of the Council, the  
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Commission and the European Central Bank; and at the national level by the Mem-
ber States, with full support and cooperation from the European Parliament. 
A three part approach which will be developed into an overall EU recovery ac-
tion plan/framework includes: a new financial market architecture at the EU level 
(read as: stronger state support and control); increasing investments in R&D innova-
tion and education, with country-specific differences allowed in fiscal room for ma-
noeuvres (read as: enhancing the EU position but maintaining state’s fiscal sover-
eignty), and a global response to the financial crisis (neoliberalism in international 
affairs but wider and stronger control at home). In March 2009, the EU included two 
additional components in its proposal: changing the role of the IMF and plans to 
adopt a global charter for sustainable economic activity as a first step toward a set of 
global governance standards (European Union 2009). 
At the Pittsburgh summit, the EU was able to present an even more unified 
position. This might be attributed to pressure exercised jointly by the leaders of the 
UK, France and Germany. In their letter to the President of the European Council 
ahead of the Pittsburgh summit, they reiterated that the summit success depended on 
a unified EU position. Such a position had to include exit strategies, supervision of 
systemically relevant financial institutions and countermeasures for non-cooperative 
jurisdictions related to tax avoidance. Keeping in mind that these countries were im-
plementing the largest stimulus packages and that the EU economic dynamics largely 
depends on those economies, it is not surprising how easily “national” agendas have 
been transformed into a single EU stand.  
 
3. G7: Economic and Trade Liberalism, Beneficial Globalization 
 
Leaders of the seven most developed nations have been active in issuing joint decla-
rations since the beginning of 2008, but their views have changed somewhat during 
the course of the crisis. In Tokyo, February 2008, the G7 finance ministers concluded 
that the world economy remained vulnerable to tighter credits, a deterioration of the 
US housing market, higher oil prices and rising inflation. In the beginning of 2008, 
the world's richest nations said they stood ready to take appropriate actions, individu-
ally and collectively, in order to secure stability and growth. Consequently, the mar-
ket economy was not questioned and troubles were detected only in the short-term 
money markets. They continued to firmly support open trade, investment regimes 
and globalization benefits.  
In February 2009, at the G7 meeting in Rome, a general intonation of the final 
communiqué radically changed. The severity and reach of the crisis was admitted 
and despite the fact that the market economy principles were not challenged, more 
specific issues were discussed: the need to restore normal credit flows, enhance li-
quidity and use newly created instruments and facilities, strengthen banks’ capital 
base, and so on. For the first time, wide fiscal packages were proposed, as well as the 
need to redesign the international financial system (particularly the IMF). 
Two particular features of the G7 responses differ them from the majority of 
other (inter)governmental responses. Firstly, they always manage to link issues of 
wider (or greater) importance to their own markets’ development, such as the value 
of Chinese currency, Japan’s rising fiscal imbalance, the growth of sovereign wealth  
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funds, terrorism, oil prices, and so on. Secondly, the G7 has been among the very few 
to underscore the significance of cooperation with private sector, for instance in de-
veloping mutually recognized securities regimes. The transition of the leading role 
from G7 to G20, ever wider issue-linkages in dealing with the crisis, and the in-
volvement of private actors might serve well to illustrate that traditional approaches 
to international regimes (Ruggie 1993; Kratochwil 2007) are gaining in significance. 
 
4. G8: International Organizations’ Coordination, Structural 
Changes 
 
The finance ministers of G8 (the G7 plus Russia) met in June 2008 in Osaka, again to 
reaffirm their beliefs in basic market principles but their final address clearly pointed 
out a new dimension to be taken. Namely, by calling upon a range of international 
(intergovernmental) organizations to start immediately providing their own inputs to 
national measures, they implicitly recognized the need for more structural changes. 
In other words (Underhill and Zhang 2006, p. 8), the group acknowledged the need 
for steering various multi-level entities toward shared rules. 
The list of institutions and issues included Financial Stability Board, (cross-
border cooperation in crisis management, sound compensation principles, sound fi-
nancial systems), International Accounting Standards Board (off balance sheet items, 
valuation in illiquid markets), International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(code of conduct for credit rating agencies, improved disclosure by financial institu-
tions), the Basel Committee (sound practice guidance on liquidity risk management), 
the OECD (best practices for open investment regimes), the World Trade Organiza-
tion (successful conclusion of the Doha Round), International Energy Agency (vola-
tility and level of oil and commodity prices) and the Financial Action Task Force 
(survey of financial system abuses). 
In October 2008, the G8 summit allowed for the first time doubts to be raised 
regarding the quality of financial market regulation and the global system design. In 
the final statement they emphasized that while the focus was then on the immediate 
task of stabilizing markets and restoring confidence, changes to the regulatory and 
institutional regimes for the world's financial sectors were needed to remedy defi-
ciencies exposed by the current crisis. 
 
5. IMF: National Actions, International Spillovers,  
Private Capital 
 
In April 2009, the International Monetary Fund presented concrete figures of eco-
nomic losses from the financial crisis, arguing for forceful and immediate action on 
both the financial and macroeconomic policy fronts. As governments face a number 
of options and combinations in designing the response, leaders must be aware that 
the choice they make will produce effects in a wider transnational economic space. 
Initiatives that support trade and financial flows - including fiscal stimuli - will help 
support global demand, but moves toward trade and financial protectionism would be 
greatly damaging to all. The global financial architecture has become inadequate for  
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such an interconnected world economy and hence the greatest policy priority is fi-
nancial sector restructuring, including common basic methodologies for the realistic 
asset valuation to be agreed among countries. The IMF primarily called for national 
regulation and national systems to be transformed in order to support the revival of 
global flows of private capital:  
“Recent reforms to increase the flexibility of lending instruments for good per-
formers caught in bad weather, together with plans advanced by the G20 summit to 
increase the resources available to the IMF, are enhancing the capacity of the interna-
tional financial community to address risks related to sudden stops of private capital 
flows.” (International Monetary Fund 2009b.) 
Regardless of widespread calls for the IMF to be reformed, this “champion of 
globalization” (James Putzel 2004, p. 5) obviously continues to support private capi-
tal among other pillars of the outdated Washington Consensus. Nevertheless, for con-
tinuing or revived legitimacy of the IMF, not only good performance that counts, but 
also its ability to conform to shared values and to some global model of good gov-
ernance (Cerutti 2007, p. 4). Hence, it is not surprising that certain proposals (Chris-
tian Thimann 2007, p. 13) strongly advocate reforms that would place the IMF in the 
centre of an international economic dialogue. Yet others strongly criticize the limit-
edness of such reforms because they reflect the preferences of an alliance of national 
and multilateral agencies in the financial and monetary sphere, with powerful trans-
national market players based in these highly developed economies (Underhill and 
Zhang 2006, p. 3). 
 
6. BRIC: Democratic International System,  
New Global Leadership 
 
In May 2008, the BRIC summit in Yekaterinburg brought together ministers from the 
second largest food producer (Brazil), the biggest energy exporter (Russia), the larg-
est democracy (India), and the most populous country (China). The agenda for the 
meeting sought to turn their combined economic power into political clout and cov-
ered issues from the global food crisis to the UN reform. The joint communiqué re-
leased at the conclusion of the summit outlined vastly different positions than those 
of the G8 and International Monetary Fund. The BRIC ministers urged the creation 
of a more democratic global system with the rule of law and multilateral diplomacy, 
wherein emerging markets should have a greater role and the dominant powers ad-
here to rules as all other countries. In this way, an expanded, new political commu-
nity might add legitimacy (Underhill and Zhang 2006, p. 11) to the governance of the 
world economy which should be characterized by an accountable, legitimate, effec-
tive and fair governance structure (Germain 2007, p. 5). 
In November 2008, BRIC countries stated their dissatisfaction with the global 
financial and economic order and called for introducing new principles and a new 
organization of the world financial system. Criticizing the G7 leadership, they 
wanted to see the G20 reinforced and elevated to a heads-of-state and heads-of-
government level, above the finance ministerial status it had for a long time. 
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During the IMF meetings in March 2009, BRIC countries issued a separate 
communiqué, calling for their bigger voice in international bodies, and backed a 
large increase in IMF resources. “To achieve this goal, we emphasize the importance 
of better-focused even-handed surveillance across all IMF members, especially in 
respect to advanced economies with major international financial centres and large 
cross-border capital flows.” (International Monetary Fund 2009c.)  The crisis has 
demonstrated that the IMF must strengthen its capability to monitor and give policy 
advice on the global economy. A few months later, BRIC countries proposed a con-
crete move: a 7 percent shift in IMF quotas in favour of developing countries, more 
than the 5 percent the United States proposed and which was later accepted by the 
G20. 
 
7. European Central Bank: Long View, Multilateralism  
Informal Groupings 
 
In discussing scenarios for the future of the global financial system during the 2009 
Davos meeting, Jean-Claude Trichet, the ECB President, called for taking a step back 
to get a “bigger” economic picture (World Economic Forum 2009). World leaders 
needed a long-term vision to shape a more resilient system with strong governance, 
greater transparency and fight against “pro-cyclicality”. As a counterpart to the new 
financial architecture, he called for convincing, reasonable macroeconomic policies 
with effective surveillance and greater accountability in most dynamic parts of finan-
cial markets (for example, derivatives). A combination of micro and macro factors is 
the root of the present crisis and the turmoil cannot be explained by one or two vari-
ables. “Facts common to multiple markets suggest the existence of a common factor: 
one of these common factors was the lack of sufficient medium-term orientation of 
global macro policies. Structural issues have been at play in the development of im-
balances in advanced economies.” (Jean-Claude Trichet 2009.)  
The ECB strongly supports more rigorous regulation of the global financial 
system but only if it meets two fundamental goals: prevention of excessive risk tak-
ing, and creation of an environment conducive to long-term sustainable economic 
growth. In addition, the ECB supports a supranational, multilateral surveillance of 
global imbalances under the aegis of the IMF agreed by the G20. Most importantly, 
although international financial institutions have an important role to play, one must 
also consider a growing influence of new informal groupings and bodies (both public 
and private) that enable consensus building and further multilateralism development. 
 
8. UK: Financial Isolationism, Fairness, Fiscal Stimulus 
 
It is particularly instructive, for the purpose of analyzing how government responses 
change, to present the position and views of the United Kingdom. During the January 
2009 business meetings in Davos, British PM Gordon Brown admitted that one of the 
problems was the absence of a global “map” to deal with it and as the financial in-
dustry was not that globalized in the 1930s, governments had no relevant previous 
experience. Again, globalization was taken as something that happens in the outer 
sphere and governments could do nothing than to react to such a process (Geoffrey  
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Garrett 2000, p. 29). He added that the international financial system had to be re-
built and offered a confusing explanation: such an effort would partly serve as a 
means of limiting the contagion problem (limit negative globalization effects), but at 
the same time it would present a support to basic market principles (continue harvest-
ing positive globalization effects). Governments were to decide how to set the border 
between the positive and negative effects of globalization as not everything could be 
left to the market. 
Implicitly admitting the danger of further deterioration of the UK’s position in 
the world finance, Brown underscored that financial protectionism was a greater 
danger than trade protectionism. He referred to unilateral actions of several countries 
that restrict government funding to national financial institutions thus barring their 
overseas operations from similar benefits. This is leading to the withdrawal of capital 
from these institutions’ foreign operations and a new form of financial isolationism. 
Nevertheless, after just two months (and during the London G20 meeting 
preparation), the focus of attention changed from global financial flows to family and 
business values, through bringing the UK’s financial markets into proper alignment 
with the values held by families and business people across the country - hard work, 
taking responsibility, being honest, being fair. 
In April 2009, the UK (together with the US) pressed hard for a wide, interna-
tionally coordinated fiscal stimulus that could help the real economy and inter alia, 
the seriously affected British economy, but with no success. Nevertheless, the alli-
ance managed to concurrently resist the Franco-German efforts to introduce strict 
and comprehensive supervision rules for the global finance. Still, in preparation for 
the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, the UK joined forces with Germany and 
France regarding several particular issues (as described above). In addition, the UK 
Prime Minister proposed a series of principles, including a financial system based on 
responsibility, transparency and integrity; sound macroeconomic policies; open 
economies; environmentally sustainable production; and fair distribution of the bene-
fits of growth. What was also needed was a global agreement (and a regime) regard-
ing durable growth that will in turn positively affect the country’s security. In other 
words, the UK seems ready to use international institutions and arrangements. This 
supports the arguments of Underhill and Zhang that governments are becoming more 
inclined to actively participate in international arrangements for the purpose of en-
hancing their capacity to deal effectively with the denationalized economic structure.  
 
9. France / Germany: New World - New Capitalism 
 
Although the financial sectors of France and Germany have experienced different 
levels of stress under the current crisis (the former being less affected in relative 
terms), two governments seem to share very similar positions as to the solution for 
current turmoil and the future financial architecture. 
In January 2009, under the banner “New world - new capitalism”, politicians 
and financial experts met in Paris to discuss how the world can protect itself from 
financial crises in future. It was certainly one of the first occasions when leaders 
from both “worlds” were openly suggesting that the market-economy system, on na-
tional and international level, had faced serious challenges.  
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In line with the prevalent state-capitalism and social market economy tradi-
tion, Chancellor Angela Merkel called for a stronger governmental cooperation, for 
the current crisis was seen as an expression of poorly coordinated globalization. New 
regulation for the international financial markets was urgently needed and she pro-
posed that an economic council be established under the auspices of the United Na-
tions. Such a new organization, mirroring a world government, would be in charge of 
creating international regulation with binding rules for business at the world level. 
More influence and more responsibilities of states would create conditions for the 
development of a social market economy with global dimensions. Europe must once 
again play a major role in that process. 
At the Pittsburgh summit, Ms Merkel pressed even harder for a system of 
global and detailed financial regulation. She called for a worldwide system in which 
every financial market product, every financial location and every financial institu-
tion would be regulated. The German idea of introducing a charter for sustainable 
economic activity under the auspices of the United Nations has since been adopted as 
the official position of the European Union but with significant resistance from the 
US and the UK.  
The crisis of capital is also a crisis of capitalism, declared French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, adding that the aim must not be to abolish capitalism, but to modify 
it. State interventionism forms one of the most significant elements in such modifica-
tions. It is necessary for moral and ethical values to be more firmly anchored in the 
system because they formed the basis for other fundamental values of capitalism 
(The Huffington Post 2009).  
At the summit in Pittsburgh, France further developed the idea by introducing 
a new concept of development and progress. The G20 should initiate a fight against 
the “cult of figures” and the “cult of the market” because in times of crisis there is an 
obligation to seek other economic models - new paths for the future and for a new 
world. In addition to economic figures, there should be measures of well-being to 
promote “the politics of civilization”. These might include environmental sustainabil-
ity, public services and possibilities for people to devote time to achieve certain fam-
ily values. 
Both France and Germany see the current crisis also as good opportunity to 
enhance Europe’s position, particularly in relation to more technologically advanced 
economies. According to them, if European businesses can be put on a sound techno-
logical footing for the future, they could be in a stronger position post-crisis than be-
fore. Needless to say, both countries are among the most influential ones in designing 
the EU policies (including those of over-protecting the EU market, hence causing its 
productivity lag) and the crisis might also be an opportunity to correct policy mis-
takes from the past. The position(s) of Germany and France might serve as a practi-
cal example how the notion of “world governance” transforms from a political idea 
into an emerging political project (Phillip S. Muller and Markus Lederer 2005).   
 
10. China: New International Partnerships, New Institutions 
 
More than other developing countries, China sees the crisis as a significant opportu-
nity to improve its growth, as its economy has not suffered a decline comparable to  
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the developed countries. Beijing wants further strengthening of global financial mar-
kets and a strong but reciprocal fight against protectionism (Setser 2008, p. 24). Part 
of Beijing’s plan is a substantial reform of international financial institutions, in or-
der to give developing nations more power. (Currently at the IMF, for example, 
China has a 3.7 per cent voting stake, less than Germany and Britain.) It also backs 
plans for a new global reserve currency to replace the US dollar which certainly adds 
another dimension to the already changing currency structure of world capital flows. 
Radical proposals have also included changing the role of governments in to-
day’s economies, introducing new models of market economies and dismantling in-
ternational financial institutions all together. China presses for initiating an institu-
tional experiment, in terms of market actors, processes and structures, which could 
more readily accepted and shared by authorities and investors worldwide.  
Both official and unofficial voices from China agree that the country has ac-
quired a new and powerful position in the international community but they disagree 
as to what role it should play: the one “prescribed” to it within the existing global 
system (by other major powers) or a new one within reformed world architecture. 
The fact remains that China would like to see further development of multilateralism 
and a greater role of the UN in handling international affairs. One must bear in mind 
that rules of global governance can be maintained (held legitimate) only if widely 
accepted and obeyed voluntarily (Underhill and Zhang 2006, p. 15 and p. 49). If, 
however, such a major player as China is strongly questioning the legitimacy of the 
present order and institutions, the success of current global politics raises serious 
doubts.  
 
11. Russia: International Supremacy and Power 
 
In addition to its activities, ideas and agenda pursued within the BRIC group of coun-
tries, Russia obviously wants to use the crisis for making a re-entry to the world 
scene and at least partially regain channels of influence. 
“Naturally the world is asking why should we take seriously the American 
model of ‘free-enterprise’ as the debacle worsens? This crisis, it seems, is to America 
what ‘imperial overstrain’ was to Great Britain: a slow-motion unwind of interna-
tional power and credibility - in short, the erosion of U.S. supremacy around the 
world and the ushering in of a ‘post-American system’.” (Cody Ross 2009.) 
Russia came to the G20 summit in April 2009 with the most radical agenda for 
change, including proposals to counter US dominance, empower poorer countries 
and send an “obsolescent” economic order to the past. The Kremlin view is that the 
global economic downturn is the result of a collapse of the existing financial system 
due to poor management and basic inadequacies. According to the view, almost all 
components of the global system should be reformed: international monetary and 
financial systems, institutions and international regulation.  
After the Pittsburgh summit, President Medvedev was happy to report that 
from a number of aspects, a new reality of the international political scene has been 
accepted by international community, thus marking at least the beginning of legiti-
macy rise. Russia’s pressures for redistribution of quotas yielded results, showing 
“responsible attitudes” of various state leaders with regard to their international obli- 
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gations. More importantly, a “revolutionary change” was introduced regarding multi-
lateral monitoring of macroeconomic parameters of the world’s largest economies, 
not only by the IMF but also by other countries.  
 
12. United States: From Reaganomics to Obamanomics 
 
Even before the major bankruptcies of the US banks, the presidential campaign re-
vealed a shift in the agenda of the then-candidate Barack Obama. The US economy 
was beginning to slow down and refocusing was clearly a necessity. America was to 
reconsider free-market principles, introduce more governmental oversight, reorgan-
ize its society toward achieving more equality and less uncertainty, but at the same 
time continue to pursue its role as the world leader. The shareholder’s principle in 
creating international arrangements (Underhill and Zhang 2006) was reiterated as 
their common purpose, also for a new century.  
After the new administration came into office and the crisis developed, those 
basic ideas found their way into various rescue and assistance packages. In addition 
to efforts for redesigning a new economic structure of “US Inc.”, fiscal packages 
were passed aiming at wealth redistribution and revival of the middle class. New 
roles for the government were envisaged but at the same time, the state budget was 
not planned to be the only financial source. Private investors such as hedge funds and 
private equity firms would be a key component in the plan to rescue US banks and 
public-private partnership should be promoted. 
The G20 summit in April 2009 was actually the first opportunity for the new 
administration to test its positions vis-à-vis international responses to the crisis. In 
accordance with the tradition (and its position), the US was reluctant to proposals for 
“submitting” its economy to supranational rules and regulation. The latter was 
pressed for by France and Germany but fortunately for the US, the EU was not that 
unified regarding internationally-binding financial regulation and financial assis-
tance.  
Financial regulatory reform in the US has been planned to fortify the imple-
mentation of two basic principles: transparency and accountability, in addition to 
centralizing financial oversight and expanding Fed powers. A very strong message 
was also sent to other countries: the US would insist they also proceed with regula-
tory reforms but never at the expense of market principles and open trade, which was 
called a false choice. 
At the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, the US position was more con-
solidated and the group adopted President Obama’s framework for improved eco-
nomic cooperation and coordination. The framework outlined three basic dimensions 
of future (US) growth: strength, sustainability and balance (Group of Twenty 2009b). 
Those economic values, regardless of their questionable complementarities and 
trade-offs, would result in necessary realignments of global private demand for long-
term growth (for all). Furthermore, in its closing remarks, President Obama openly 
admitted that in the world of shared security and prosperity, the US own interests 
depend on other countries’ actions. Declining US economic power and deteriorating 
political coherence at home on the one hand, and increasing transnationalisation of 
economic issues on the other hand, resulted in a change of the US agenda. These fac- 
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tors have also undermined the capacity of the US government to simultaneously cope 
with the problems of global integration and to commit to global governance (Under-
hill and Zhang 2006, p. 19). For the US, the international community does exist, in-
terdependence cannot be overlooked anymore, common values have been developed 
and, most importantly, (all) members of international community have the obligation 
to work toward realizing those common values.  
 
13. G20: Minimal Common Denominator 
 
During 2008, the G20 was among the most energetic actors on the world scene with 
regard to making proposals and measures to counter the current crisis. Not surpris-
ingly, those proposals were quite comprehensive and focused issues beyond “classi-
cal” monetary/fiscal policy approach to macroeconomic stability. The comprehen-
siveness of the G20 proposals also derived from linking various issues such as pov-
erty reduction, social inclusion, emerging and low income countries, aid flows, cli-
mate change and cooperation with the private sector. The G20’s current status as a 
discoursive organisation is in this way contrasted with the more strongly decisional 
types of other intergovernmental actors, such as the IMF (Richard Higgott 2004) and 
might shed more light on the future of multilateralism. Following the arguments of 
Muller and Lederer (2003), among the three strategies to categorize global govern-
ance emerge, the power and activities of the G20 might point to a new developing 
form of managing global affairs with specific actors, instruments and practices.  
Following numerous formal and informal meetings within and outside the 
group, and in conjunction with other streams of political actions described above, the 
G20 summit in April 2009 resulted in three declarations on the recovery plan, the 
financial system and resources to implement the plan. The Global Plan for Recovery 
and Reform (Group of Twenty 2009a) underscores that fairness/equality in enjoying 
indivisible growth and its sustainability are the leading values. In order to achieve 
them, two basic components are agreed: effectively regulated market economy and 
strong, supranational institutions. Promotion of global trade and rejection of protec-
tionism fall well behind the goals to restore confidence, growth, employment and 
lending, but ahead of an inclusive, green and sustainable recovery. A commitment 
was made to implement a $1.1 trillion programme in support credit markets, growth 
and employment in the world economy. 
Without the need to go into much detail, one must pay particular attention to 
different levels of norms planned to guide further actions. Four different types (or 
levels) of norms can be identified in the documents: global standards (most binding 
ones, applicable to all countries - related to accounting standards and principles); 
internationally-agreed norms (subject to separate agreements - financial system regu-
lation); good practice (desirable, recommended - activities of credit rating agencies) 
and a consistent approach (most flexible - basic principles of national financial regu-
lation, for example, the coverage, boundaries). This clearly reflects that, beyond joint 
pictures taken and statements made, the G20 leaders have set a particular “scale” of 
submitting their own policies and principles to global harmonization. Nevertheless, 
unless the norms and the policies in which they manifest themselves are perceived by 
the community as authoritative, and that they can be justified in terms of shared be- 
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liefs (Underhill and Zhang 2006, p. 10), there is still a long way for new, global gov-
ernance in the field of finance to emerge. 
The core part of the documents focuses on strengthening financial supervision 
and regulation. In order to secure much greater consistency and systematic coopera-
tion, a new international body should be established - a Financial Stability Board. It 
would encompass a wider membership and work closely with the IMF to provide 
early warning of macroeconomic and financial risks. Most importantly, from the as-
pect of this paper, the G20 agreed “to extend regulation and oversight to all systemi-
cally important financial institutions, instruments and markets. This will include, for 
the first time, systemically important hedge funds.” (Group of Twenty 2009a.)  
The G20 Summit in Pittsburgh proved that leaders decided to keep the spot-
light on their actions, at least in the short term. Though not yielding many results in 
terms of structural transformations (output side) as the London Summit did, this 
event brought forward two major changes. First, the G20, as a precursor to expanding 
the political community, should take over from the G8 the role of centre forum for 
the creation of new international economic architecture. Second, leading intergov-
ernmental financial institutions should be reformed in a way that would give more 
voting power to dynamic emerging economies, thus enhancing the probability of 
successful future implementation of global norms. The G20 agreed to strong interna-
tional standards for bank capital and compensation, as well as for more transparent 
over-the-counter derivatives markets. Reaching a consensus on the incorporation of 
macro-prudential concerns about system wide risks into international regulation has 
been one of the most significant accomplishments. 
But maybe most importantly, the Pittsburgh Summit has initiated “a regulatory 
race to the top” for reaching international agreement and for implementing new stan-
dards nationally. One must not forget that, back in the 1970s, it was similar state 
competition (though in opposite direction of deregulation) that created the impetus 





The global capital market of today has not come into existence suddenly - it has 
evolved as a result of a multitude of trends and actors’ strategies (including the state 
ones) to capture the benefits of globalization, in terms of rising efficiency, maximiz-
ing profit and developing flexibility to market changes. 
On the other hand, governmental responses to the crisis (and the G20 com-
promise) seem to focus on only a limited set of particular issues directly related to 
global capital trends: stronger (national) supervision, hedge funds, tax heavens, 
bankers’ remuneration, and so on. National policy actions have been more compre-
hensive, including wide fiscal packages, capital injections to (important) financial 
institutions, and stimuli to the industrial sector. Most of those actions, implicitly or 
explicitly, relied on some sort of protectionism which by its nature contravenes glob-
alization and international cooperation. Nevertheless, most world leaders, groups and 
organizations felt obliged to point out that in the present world, cooperation and joint 
efforts are the sine quibus non if the global economy is to resume its “normal” func-
tioning.   
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And here is the critical part: how should the world economy normally func-
tion? Through a completely new world economic system, based on non-neoliberal 
principles (though proponents of these ideas do not offer alternative principles)? 
Should such a change necessarily involve a change of global leadership (though the 
proponents have not openly submitted their candidacy)? Should a new social order 
(“new” capitalism) be based on social welfare, strong state presence and ownership? 
Is that maybe going back to traditional (Protestant) ethics of honesty, hard work and 
responsible way of living? Or does the normally functioning world economy depend 
on the development of public-private partnerships and critical remodelling of the 
governance concept? So far, leaders have agreed jointly to support the global econ-
omy with a financial injection worth around 1/200th of world financial assets. This 
might not seem like too much, but it is certainly a beginning. What lay ahead, after 
$1.1 trillion is spent, is maybe a long process of building a set of shared values that 
might create a basis for legitimate and efficient governance.  
In September 2009, one of the most influential advisories to the G20, the 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, issued a report that clearly defines two 
possible but opposite paths for a new world regulation of capital flows (Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision 2009). One option for reform would be to reach a 
broad and enforceable agreement on sharing crisis financial burdens among different 
jurisdictions. However, as this option would give rise to considerable challenges, an 
international agreement on such mechanisms appears unlikely in the short term. An 
alternative path would be a “ring fencing” approach to supervision and a territorial 
approach to supervising cross-border groups. The second option might also be di-
rectly counterproductive. There is a possibility that uncoordinated actions of national 
regulators could increase stress on banking groups and the probability of further de-
faults, thus complicating crisis management (Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion 2009, p. 7). Having in mind different “scale” of readiness of individual govern-
ments to accept global standards, it is very unclear how such an extension of supra-
national regulation will be designed and put in practice. 
Differential powers, interests and ideologies of political actors are always con-
stitutive elements of nascent regulatory arrangements. In present global finance, 
those significant differences affect at least two aspects of the existing structure: ar-
rangement of the parts and ranking within the structure. Therefore, future solutions 
will need to be developed in a holistic and interdisciplinary way to ensure that the 
concerns of all stakeholders are addressed and “dots are connected”. Whatever the 
list and priorities of concerns governments may have, it is important to hold that such 
a new framework cannot be seen only in the short-term dimension of what seems to 
matter today, but also in terms of how far those new arrangements and institutions 
are prepared to confront challenges that, even if not in the spot light today, are rec-
ognizably contained in structures and trends of world finance. Future politics is re-
quested to become politics for the future no less than for the present world. Hence 
time will play an explicit role and will confront “a challenge politics as we have 
known it during modernity may not be up to” (Cerutti 2007, p. 15). 
Years ago, Kenneth N. Waltz (1979, p. 141) wrote that it was not possible to 
understand an economy or explain its functioning without considering the rules that  
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were politically laid down. This paper presented an overview of the official pro-
nouncements at the beginning of and during the crisis. Future research related to the 
crisis should focus on three major areas: political processes to allow convergence of 
various agendas, implementation of the agreed norms and structures, and economic 
developments in global capital flows. Is there a possibility that, in the foreseeable 
future, heads of the territorial spaces become able and willing to discover and jointly 
decide on the basic postulates of the present global economy? What is the inner logic 
of the global capital flows and what are both beneficial and harmful consequences of 
such logic? Irreversibly transterritorial flows of capital have started to exert such a 
significant pressure to heads of states that some sort of hierarchic compromise might 
be expected in years to come. Bearing in mind that an order’s legitimacy depends 
strongly on the body of shared beliefs, what remains to be seen is to which of today’s 
multiple agendas (input side) new or adapted global rules and norms (output side) 
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